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1173 
Comment 
 
STATE PRISONERS WITH FEDERAL CLAIMS IN FEDERAL 
COURT: WHEN CAN A STATE PRISONER OVERCOME 
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT? 
MEGAN RAKER∗ 
When can the deficient performance of state post-conviction counsel 
excuse defects in a constitutional claim adjudicated in a federal habeas 
proceeding?  Once a federal court decides whether to review the conviction 
or sentence of a state prisoner on federal habeas review, it will consider 
both the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claim and whether the 
prisoner brought the claim to the federal court free of procedural defects.1  
A frequent procedural defect—known as procedural default—occurs when 
a state court denies relief based on an adequate and independent state 
procedural ground.2 
Errors committed during post-conviction litigation might force an 
inmate to forfeit a meritorious claim in state court.  Although the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee 
effective assistance of trial counsel in criminal proceedings,3 this right has 
not been extended to prisoners in state habeas proceedings.4  State habeas 
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 1.  See infra Part I.B. 
 2.  See infra notes 60–67. 
 3.  See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) 
(extending the Sixth Amendment’s fundamental guarantee of counsel through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prisoners in state court). 
 4.  Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (extending Finley to apply to capital and 
noncapital cases); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (holding that states are not 
required to provide counsel for prisoners seeking post-conviction relief); see also Lee Kovarsky, 
AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 466 (2007) (noting 
that a federal statute provides prisoners with counsel in federal post-conviction proceedings yet 
there is “no federal requirement that offenders have effective counsel during any state collateral 
review”). 
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proceedings are distinct from and collateral to the direct review process 
where a prisoner may raise constitutional challenges to the conviction and 
sentence.  When prisoners are forced to face this process without the 
assistance of counsel, the complex state habeas procedural rules may 
prevent a federal court—or any court—from adjudicating the prisoner’s 
meritorious claim alleging that the state is holding the prisoner in violation 
of the U.S. Constitution.5 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has crafted an exception to the 
procedural default doctrine,6 allowing a federal court to excuse default of a 
state prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim (“IATC”)7 if 
the prisoner’s post-conviction counsel was ineffective as well.8  In Martinez 
v. Ryan,9 the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he right to the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.”10  
The Court held that, in states where a prisoner may only raise IATC claims 
on collateral review, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may 
constitute cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted IATC claim.11  A year 
later, in Trevino v. Thaler,12 the Court clarified the Martinez exception, 
noting that the exception applied to states in which the procedural 
framework made it “highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will 
have a meaningful opportunity to raise [an IATC claim] on direct appeal.”13  
Rather than declare a constitutional right to adequate state post-conviction 
counsel, the Court invoked its equitable authority over the habeas remedy to 
allow federal habeas courts to consider a prisoner’s IATC claim despite the 
procedural default in state court.14  The Martinez Court emphasized that 
because IATC claims are directed usually to state collateral review 
proceedings, these proceedings are analogous to the prisoner’s direct appeal 
to that claim.15  Viewed from that perspective, a prisoner should not be 
                                                          
 5.  See infra Part I.D.  
 6.  For an explanation of the procedural default doctrine, see infra notes 60–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 7.  Although ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claims are traditionally referred to with 
the acronym “IAC,” this Comment uses the acronym “IATC”.  The purpose is to distinguish 
between the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, the “IATC” claims, and claims that the 
prisoner’s counsel was ineffective in a state habeas proceeding.  IATC claims challenge the 
counsel’s performance at trial as being so constitutionally deficient as to not function as the 
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
 8.  See infra Part I.D.1. 
 9.  132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 10.  Id. at 1317 (emphasis added). 
 11.  Id. at 1315. 
 12.  133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
 13.  Id. at 1921.  
 14.  Id. at 1919–20.   
 15.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. 
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denied the benefit of federal habeas review of a substantial IATC claim 
because of ineffective post-conviction counsel.16 
IATC claims and Brady v. Maryland17 claims that the prosecution 
withheld exculpatory evidence18 are among the claims raised most often on 
collateral review.19  This Comment ultimately concludes that the nature of 
Brady claims—in how they are raised on collateral review and the 
constitutional rights they protect—are such that the Martinez exception can, 
and should, apply to Brady claims as well.20 
Part I of this Comment will follow the path of a prisoner’s federal 
post-conviction claims in both the state and federal habeas review processes 
and will examine the effect of Martinez and Trevino on these processes.  
Part II.A will explain why the “narrow exception” referred to in the 
Martinez-Trevino duo is not so narrow.  Part II.B will focus on why Brady 
claims, so similar in nature to IATC claims, should fall within the exception 
covered by Martinez.  Finally, Part II.C will explain why denial of the 
Martinez exception in Brady claims serves as an injustice to the principle 
that a prisoner receive at least one opportunity to litigate substantial due 
process challenges to a conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In the context of federal habeas review of state criminal convictions, 
federal courts today employ the writ of habeas corpus to review the 
constitutionality of state criminal proceedings.21  When a state prisoner is 
                                                          
 16.  Id.  
 17.  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 18.  See id. at 87 (holding “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). 
 19.  Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 
600 (2009). 
 20.  See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 21.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953) (rejecting the idea that the writ of habeas 
corpus in federal courts is “authorized for state prisoners at the discretion of the federal court,” but 
that it may “only [be] authorized when a state prisoner is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States”).  Brown, a landmark case in modern post-conviction 
jurisprudence, extended the scope of federal habeas review to include constitutional errors in state 
criminal process.  Prior to this case, only state court jurisdictional errors could be reviewed by a 
federal habeas court.  See, e.g., Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915) (“[T]he writ of 
habeas corpus will lie only in case the judgment under which the prisoner is detained is shown to 
be absolutely void for want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced it . . . .”); Charles Alan 
Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future, 81 MICH. L. REV. 802, 806 (1983) (“The 
expansion of the writ in the 1950s and 1960s has strengthened the federal courts at the expense of 
their state counterparts and has been a means for imposing federal constitutional standards on state 
criminal proceedings.”). 
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held in “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States,” the prisoner may be entitled to federal habeas relief.22 
Although habeas review entitles an inmate to challenge a conviction or 
sentence in federal court, the availability of relief turns on the absence of 
procedural defects in the claim.23  Part I.A begins with an overview of the 
post-conviction review process, specifically focusing on how an inmate 
advances from challenging the conviction on direct appeal in state court, to 
a collateral, state habeas review proceeding.24  Part I.B then follows the 
path of the prisoner’s claim when raised in a federal writ of habeas corpus, 
specifically focusing on what happens when the prisoner failed to follow 
state procedural rules prior to seeking federal adjudication of the claim.  
Part I.C describes two of the primary justifications federal courts have 
imposed upon limited federal habeas review for state prisoners: federalism 
and finality.  Finally, Part I.D introduces a recent Court-created exception to 
the traditional rule that state post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness 
cannot constitute cause to overcome a procedurally defaulted IATC claim. 
A.  State Collateral Review of State Convictions 
After a state court convicts and sentences a criminal defendant, the 
prisoner may then challenge either the conviction or sentence.25  The first 
step is to bring a direct appeal to a state appellate court.26  In most 
instances, claims brought on direct appeal must arise directly from evidence 
and facts on the trial record.27  Also in many instances, the same attorney 
                                                          
 22.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). 
 23.  See infra Part I.B.  A federal court, for example, is barred from granting a state prisoner’s 
application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the prisoner has exhausted all available state 
remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006), and if a state court has adjudicated the claim on the merits, 
and such adjudication was not inconsistent with clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) (2006). 
 24.  See infra Part I.A; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS 171 (2013) (“The formal name for the state post-conviction process varies by 
jurisdiction; some call it ‘state habeas,’ some call it ‘state post-conviction’ review, and some states 
use other names.”). 
 25.  See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (discussing the history and 
evolution of the right of appeal). 
 26.  Although a convicted criminal defendant has no constitutional right to an appeal to a 
higher state court, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), each of the fifty states has 
implemented its own “court of last resort” where appeals from final judgments of trial courts may 
be raised.  See, e.g., Allen v. Clark, 126 F. 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1903) (using the terms “court of last 
resort” and “state Court of Appeals” interchangeably); Beatty v. Monahan, 240 Ill. App. 240, 242 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1926) (same); see also Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 448 N.E.2d 1351, 1352 
(N.Y. 1983) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the issue at bar had been decided by 
every other court of last resort). 
 27.  See, e.g., United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that in order 
for an IATC claim “to be heard on direct appeal, it must conclusively appear[] in the trial record 
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who represented the defendant at trial will continue representation through 
the direct review process.28  Although the assistance of counsel may be 
beneficial to the prisoner in the appellate process,29 if the prisoner wishes to 
raise an IATC claim, it is unlikely that in a direct appeal proceeding—
represented by the same counsel from trial—the attorney will claim that 
counsel was ineffective at the prior trial proceeding.30 
The collateral, habeas review process is another avenue available to 
challenge unlawful convictions and sentences.31  There are both state and 
federal collateral review processes, and a prisoner held in custody pursuant 
to a state court judgment must exhaust all state collateral remedies prior to 
seeking federal habeas relief.32  Although state post-conviction procedures 
vary by jurisdiction, ordinarily collateral review is the only means by which 
a prisoner can enforce constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights when 
challenges to a prisoner’s custody depend on facts outside of the trial 
record.33 
                                                          
itself that the defendant was not provided with effective representation” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 28.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-205 (LexisNexis 2013) (mandating that 
appointed counsel of an indigent individual “continue until the final disposition of the case” unless 
otherwise relieved); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.85 (West 2014) (same); United States v. Dangdee, 
608 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that state appointed counsel’s representation continues 
through appeal unless otherwise relieved); Flansburg v. State, 103 Md. App. 394, 405, 653 A.2d 
966, 971 (1995) (same). 
 29.  See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing that an unrepresented 
appellant “is unable to protect the vital interests at stake” and even an insufficiently represented 
appellant, “a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better 
position than one who has no counsel at all”). 
 30.  See People v. Bailey, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that “there 
is an inherent conflict when appointed trial counsel in a criminal case is also appointed to act as 
counsel on appeal”); Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: 
Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2619 (2013) (recognizing 
that “an attorney cannot be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness” on appeal, and therefore, 
“the first practical opportunity these defendants have to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
is in initial collateral review proceedings”). 
 31.  See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003) (distinguishing between the 
direct and collateral review processes by recognizing “that failure to raise an [IATC] claim on 
direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate [collateral] 
proceeding”); United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing between 
the direct and collateral review processes by noting that collateral review “may not be used as a 
chance at a second appeal,” but instead “must be based upon an independent constitutional 
violation”). 
 32.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) 
(establishing the “total exhaustion rule”). 
 33.  See, e.g., Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511, 517, 474 A.2d 890, 893 (1984) (recognizing 
collateral proceedings as the preferable route for raising IATC claims because “claims of counsel 
incompetency are rarely raised at trial”); see also Michael A. Millemann, Collateral Remedies in 
Criminal Cases in Maryland: An Assessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 968, 968–69 (2005) (describing the 
collateral process as “a vital part of our criminal justice system” because it is “usually the sole 
means by which a convicted person can enforce fundamental fair-trial rights”).  
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Two leading examples of claims that, by their nature, tend to be raised 
only on collateral review are ineffectiveness of trial counsel34 and claims 
the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland.35  
To prevail on an IATC claim, a prisoner must establish that counsel’s 
representation was so deficient “that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”36  In most cases, the deficiency and resulting prejudice 
are not clear at trial, and by directing IATC claims to collateral proceedings, 
prisoners have the opportunity to make a record by presenting additional 
testimony, introducing new evidence, and offering factual findings as to 
trial counsel’s incompetence.37  In a similar manner, Brady claims require: 
“the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory or . . . impeaching evidence; that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice 
must have ensued.”38  Most often, the evidence will not be available on the 
trial record to challenge on direct review because the evidence at issue was 
not disclosed to the defense during trial.39 
It is, no doubt, difficult for an individual confined to prison to 
maneuver through the state collateral review process and gather the 
evidence necessary to raise a successful IATC or Brady claim.40  Despite 
the complexity of the claims directed toward state collateral review 
                                                          
 34.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (discussing briefly the nature of 
IATC claims).  The success of an IATC claim often depends on evidence outside the trial record.  
Id.   
 35.  A Brady claim refers to prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose exculpatory 
evidence; usually, it follows that this failure to disclose will not be part of the facts or evidence 
present in the trial record.  See Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (Fletcher, 
J., dissenting) (“For both [IATC] and Brady claims, much—sometimes all—of the important 
evidence is outside the trial record.”).  
 36.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 37.  See Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 435, 439 A.2d 542, 559 (1982) (encouraging IATC 
claims to be raised on collateral review because without additional testimony and investigation, 
the direct appellate court could not adequately determine the attorney’s ineffectiveness or 
incompetence), abrogated on other grounds by Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 373, 536 A.2d 622 (1988); 
see also Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (same).   
 38.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 39.  See Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners’ Right to Counsel: 
Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455, 479 
(1989) (noting such “nonrecord facts” have proved critical to some capital post-conviction 
attorneys). 
 40.  See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 
58 MD. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1999) (recognizing that without assistance of counsel to develop 
post-conviction claims, “[i]t is virtually impossible to conduct any kind of investigation from 
prison” and that “there is no realistic chance that a prisoner will be able to disentangle even the 
law surrounding ineffective assistance and Brady sufficiently to present a credible claim to the 
post-conviction court”). 
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proceedings, a prisoner bringing a constitutional claim in a state collateral 
proceeding has no constitutional right to counsel.41  In Pennsylvania v. 
Finley,42 the Supreme Court held that states have no constitutional 
obligation to provide state post-conviction relief; and if states choose to do 
so, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the state to provide for the 
assistance of counsel in these proceedings.43  Some states provide counsel 
to post-conviction prisoners facing capital punishment.44  The vast majority 
of prisoners, however, appear pro se in post-conviction proceedings.45 
B.  Federal Habeas Review of State Convictions 
State prisoners may seek further habeas relief in federal court.46  A 
federal writ of habeas corpus alleges that the prisoner’s conviction and 
custody is in violation of the federal Constitution, federal laws, or federal 
treaties.47  A meritorious claim, however, is not enough to obtain federal 
habeas relief.48  Before entertaining a claim on the merits, federal courts are 
required to determine whether the claim is free of procedural defects.49 
State prisoners typically face several procedural barriers when 
attempting to raise constitutional challenges to state convictions in federal 
court.50  A federal court will accept a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of 
                                                          
 41.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (highlighting the difficulty a prisoner 
has in raising an IATC claim without effective assistance of post-conviction counsel); see also 
Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that absent a constitutional 
right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, attorney error in these proceedings could 
not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default).  
 42.  481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
 43.  Id. at 555–57.  But see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (reasoning 
that although there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to appeal a state criminal conviction, 
when a state provides an appeal as of right, the state must also provide counsel to represent the 
defendant on that first appeal). 
 44.  Christopher T. Robertson, Contingent Compensation of Post-Conviction Counsel: A 
Modest Proposal to Identify Meritorious Claims and Reduce Wasteful Government Spending, 64 
ME. L. REV. 513, 519–20 (2012) (recognizing that “[s]ome states provide very minimal 
compensation for attorneys representing capital prisoners, but most states provide no 
compensation at all for non-capital prisoners”). 
 45.  See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS 23 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf 
(finding that out of a random sample of over 3,000 federal habeas writs filed by state prisoners, 
87.5% of capital prisoners were pro se when they first filed and 95% of non-capital prisoners were 
pro se at the beginning of their case). 
 46.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. § 2254(b)(1) (identifying several procedural requirements that must be met before 
a federal court will grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus). 
 49.  See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (noting that federal courts are 
generally barred from reviewing a prisoner’s federal claim when the prisoner failed to meet a state 
procedural requirement). 
 50.  See supra note 48. 
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habeas corpus, only after the prisoner raised all the claims contained in the 
writ before a state court, thereby giving the state a chance to adjudicate the 
prisoner’s claims first.51  If the prisoner failed to follow a procedural rule 
when raising these claims in state court, the federal court will deem the 
claim to be procedurally defaulted and will deny adjudication on the 
merits.52  Even though the claims are federal in nature, failure to follow 
state procedural rules may bar federal habeas review under the independent 
and adequate state grounds doctrine.53  This doctrine provides that a federal 
court “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if 
the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of 
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”54 
1.  The Independent and Adequate State Grounds Doctrine 
A federal court receiving a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus must first determine the source of law on which the state judgment 
was grounded.55  Often, state courts are presented with federal questions, 
but if a state court decides the issue on independent and adequate state law 
grounds,56 a federal court sitting in habeas review will not review the 
question of federal law.57  If, however, the court finds that the state decision 
                                                          
 51.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears 
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”). 
 52.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32. Procedurally defaulted claims will also be considered fully 
exhausted claims, thereby barring federal habeas review rather than giving the prisoner an 
opportunity to bring the federal claim before a federal court.  See id. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner 
who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for 
exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).  This rule requires that a 
federal court give state procedural rules the same effect it would give to federal ones, thus 
furthering considerations of comity and federalism.  Id. at 746.  
 53.  See id. at 728 (emphasizing that a federal district court should respect a state court’s 
decision not to address a prisoner’s federal claims when the prisoner failed to meet state 
procedural requirements because that state decision rested on “independent and adequate state 
procedural grounds”); see also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998) (“If a state 
court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a habeas petitioner’s claim on a state procedural 
rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal, the 
habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim.”). 
 54.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added).  
 55.  Id. at 732–35 (discussing appropriate application of the independent and adequate state 
ground doctrine in federal court). 
 56.  When a state court makes a “plain statement” that its opinion rests on state grounds 
independent of the federal question, federal law or federal precedent, a federal court will not 
review the state court judgment.  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983).  A rule is 
“adequate” if it is firmly established and regularly followed.  Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60–
61 (2009) (holding that a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to 
bar federal habeas review if it is “firmly established” and “regularly followed”). 
 57.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729.  The Court reasoned that “it is primarily respect for the State’s 
interests that underlies the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in 
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“appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the 
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state 
law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,”58 then the federal 
court may address the prisoner’s federal habeas petition.59 
One source of independent and adequate state law grounds is state 
procedural rules.60  A state court’s decision not to address a prisoner’s 
federal claims because the prisoner failed to meet state procedural 
requirements rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.61  
In the context of post-conviction proceedings, if a prisoner does not raise a 
claim in the first collateral proceeding in which it could be heard,62 the 
prisoner will be considered to have procedurally defaulted on this claim.63  
Unless a prisoner can overcome the procedural default, a federal court will 
be barred from reviewing the prisoner’s federal claims.64 
2.  Overcoming Procedural Default 
In order for a state prisoner to overcome a procedurally defaulted 
federal claim, the prisoner must “demonstrate cause for the default and 
actual prejudice as a result,” or establish that “a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice” will result if the federal court refuses to hear the prisoner’s claim.65  
This Comment and the cases cited within focus on the predominant cause-
                                                          
federal habeas.”  Id. at 739.  For further discussion on states’ interests justifying the hesitancy of 
federal courts to review state prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions, see infra Part I.C. 
 58.  Long, 463 U.S. at 1040–41. 
 59.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734–35. 
 60.  Id. at 729–30.  
 61.  See id. (“The [independent and adequate state ground doctrine] applies to bar federal 
habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had 
failed to meet a state procedural requirement.”). 
 62.  There is not necessarily a limit on the number of habeas petitions a prisoner can file, but 
because a successive petition involves claims attacking the same custody and involving the same 
parties as a first petition, there are statutory and judicially created restrictions as to what claims 
may be validly asserted in successive petitions.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006) (“A 
claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”); id. § 2254(e)(2) (requiring the dismissal of 
new claims raised in successive habeas petitions unless the claim only became available upon a 
newly enacted rule of constitutional law, or the claim is based on newly discovered evidence 
proving the prisoner’s innocence); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991) (acknowledging 
that the “abuse of the writ” doctrine, a restraint upon successive habeas petitions, refers to a “body 
of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and 
judicial decisions”). 
 63.  See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489 (“[A] petitioner can abuse the writ by raising a claim in a 
subsequent petition that he could have raised in his first . . . .”). 
 64.  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (noting that a prisoner can overcome a procedurally 
defaulted claim pursuant “to an independent and adequate state procedural rule”). 
 65.  Id. 
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and-prejudice test as the standard for the miscarriage-of-justice exception is 
exceptionally high and rarely met.66 
The first element of the cause-and-prejudice standard focuses on the 
source—the cause—of the procedural default.  Specifically, the prisoner 
must prove that an “objective factor external to the defense,” sometimes 
referred to as the external factor requirement, caused the prisoner’s failure 
to comply with the state procedural rule.67  The most commonly asserted 
form of cause is ineffectiveness of counsel.68  Under the standard 
established in Strickland v. Washington,69 ordinary attorney error does not 
constitute cause for a prisoner’s procedural default.70  In Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel did not extend to prisoners in post-conviction proceedings.71  
Therefore, ineffective assistance in post-conviction proceedings is not 
considered an objective factor external to the prisoner’s defense and 
generally will not establish cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted post-
conviction claim.72 
The second element of the cause-and-prejudice test focuses on the 
result of the procedural default and the harm to the prisoner if the federal 
habeas court refuses to review the merits of the defaulted claim.  The 
“actual prejudice” requirement ensures that an excused procedurally 
defaulted claim is substantial enough to justify the consideration of the 
claim in federal court despite the procedural default.73  Even if the prisoner 
can show good cause for failing to adhere to state procedural rules, the 
                                                          
 66.  The Court has made clear that the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” is 
“rare” and only applied to the “extraordinary case.”  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995).  
Although the Court has not definitively stated when a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will 
excuse a procedurally defaulted claim, the Court did note that “a constitutional violation has 
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent” and such a showing of actual 
innocence may excuse the defaulted claim, “even in the absence of a showing of cause for the 
procedural default.”  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495–96 (1986). 
 67.  See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488 (“We think, then, that the question of cause for a procedural 
default does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have made. . . .  
[W]e think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the 
prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 
comply with the State’s procedural rule.”). 
 68.  GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 24, at 216. 
 69.  466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (holding that effective assistance of counsel must be 
determined according to the objective standard of reasonableness). 
 70.  Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488 (1986). 
 71.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987). 
 72.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991) (providing that absent a 
constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the prisoner, not the state, bears the 
burden for a failure to follow state procedural rules). 
 73.  See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2012) (remanding Martinez’s IATC 
claim to the district court to decide the issue of prejudice after holding that Martinez’s ineffective 
post-conviction counsel constituted cause to excuse his procedurally defaulted IATC claim). 
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prisoner must also show that “but for” the error, “there is a reasonable 
probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”74  A presumption once existed in favor of federal habeas review 
of procedurally defaulted claims,75 but the Supreme Court has shifted away 
from that presumption in favor of the requirement for a showing of cause 
and prejudice.76 
C.  Policies Limiting Federal Habeas Review 
The Supreme Court has justified its preference for the cause-and-
prejudice standard by emphasizing principles of federalism and states’ 
interest in finality.77  The Court has indicated its preference to adhere to 
state procedural rules and respect a procedural default that results from a 
failure to follow those rules.78  This preference is due, in part, to the role 
state courts play in deciding federal constitutional questions.79  The Court 
has noted specifically the importance of the independent and adequate state 
                                                          
 74.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also Williams v. French, 146 
F.3d 203, 210 (4th Cir. 1998) (“To establish actual prejudice, the petitioner must shoulder the 
burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that 
they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 
constitutional dimensions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 75.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (holding that a federal judge was not necessarily 
barred from reviewing a claim procedurally defaulted in state court, but that “the judge may in his 
discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the 
state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies”); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 
745 (“Fay thus created a presumption in favor of federal habeas review of claims procedurally 
defaulted in state court.”). 
 76.  See Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–88 (1977) (limiting Fay to its facts and 
rejecting the sweeping language of the bypass standard); see also, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 
U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (requiring the prisoner show cause and prejudice before a federal court 
would review the prisoner’s procedurally defaulted claim); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 
242–45 (1973) (same). 
 77.  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748 (recognizing the most significant costs associated with 
“the Great Writ” to be “the cost to finality in criminal litigation” and “[f]ederal intrusions into 
state criminal trials” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Maples v. 
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 929 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As we have long recognized, federal 
habeas review for state prisoners imposes significant costs on the States, undermining not only 
their practical interest in the finality of their criminal judgments, but also the primacy of their 
courts in adjudicating the constitutional rights of defendants prosecuted under state law.” 
(citations omitted)); Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316 (“Federal habeas courts reviewing the 
constitutionality of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to 
ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the 
integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.”). 
 78.  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747 (“The cause and prejudice standard in federal habeas 
evinces far greater respect for state procedural rules than does the deliberate bypass standard of 
Fay.”). 
 79.  See id. at 729 (recognizing that when a state court decides a federal question based on 
state law independent and adequate to support the judgment, interference by a federal court would 
be advisory). 
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grounds doctrine in supporting state rules and state courts’ decisions of 
federal issues.80  If a federal court disregards the independent and adequate 
state basis of a state court’s judgment and renders the prisoner’s custody 
unconstitutional, it “ignores the State’s legitimate reasons for holding the 
prisoner.”81 
The Court has recognized the value of the cause-and-prejudice 
standard in promoting a state’s interests in the finality of criminal trials.82  
States have a legitimate interest in the finality of criminal judgments not 
being compromised by federal habeas proceedings.83  The external factor 
requirement also serves states’ interests by requiring a state only to litigate 
and defend against errors imputed to that State.84  Recognizing that the cost 
to finality of judgments is one of the greatest associated with federal habeas 
review,85 this underlying concern has been thought to be one of the driving 
forces behind the Courts limiting state prisoners’ access to federal habeas 
review.86  The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that federalism 
principles and finality interests alone will not lead a federal habeas court to 
compromise a prisoner’s constitutional rights.87 
                                                          
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 730.  
 82.  See Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72, 112 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The strict 
enforcement of procedural defaults . . . may be seen as a means of deterring any tendency on the 
part of the defense to slight the state forum, to deny state judges their due opportunity for playing 
a meaningful role in the evolving task of constitutional adjudication, or to mock the needed finality 
of criminal trials.” (emphasis added)); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 746 (recognizing that the 
broadly applied cause-and-prejudice standard in Skyes “served strong state interests in the finality 
of its criminal litigation”). 
 83.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1325 (2012) (Scalia J., dissenting) (“Criminal 
conviction[s] ought to be final before society has forgotten the crime that justifies it.”). 
 84.  See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1986) (identifying many costs borne by the 
state in the federal habeas review process, and determining that the cost of post-conviction 
attorney error should not be one of them); see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1324 (“Coleman and 
Carrier set forth in clear terms when it is that attorney error constitutes an external factor: 
Attorney error by itself does not, because when an attorney acts (or fails to act) in furtherance of 
the litigation, he is acting as the petitioner’s agent.”).   
 85.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748. 
 86.  See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALB. 
L. REV. 225, 259 (1992) (“Although comity continues to be important in molding federal habeas, 
the imperative of finality—keeping criminal convictions in place—appears to be the real 
animating force behind the Court’s habeas revolution.”).   
 87.  See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (“In appropriate cases [the principles of 
comity and finality] must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust 
incarceration.”); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 773 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The interest in finality, 
standing alone, cannot provide a sufficient reason for a federal habeas court to compromise its 
protection of constitutional rights.”); see also Robertson, supra note 44, at 522, 525 (arguing that 
federal habeas statutes and deference to state judgments cripple federal review of state 
convictions, making the whole system less efficient, and that access to contingently funded 
attorneys in post-conviction proceedings would abate the flood of frivolous habeas petitions). 
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D.  The Martinez Exception 
In Coleman v. Thompson,88 the Supreme Court emphasized the Finley 
rule that a prisoner has no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings,89 thus finding that any “error” from Coleman’s post-
conviction counsel could not constitute constitutionally ineffective 
assistance,90 and Coleman had therefore failed to establish cause to excuse 
his defaulted claims.91  The Court refrained from deciding and left open the 
issue of whether an exception to Finley existed “in those cases where state 
collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a[n IATC claim 
challenging] his conviction.”92  Twenty-one years later, the Court re-visited 
this issue in Martinez v. Ryan. 
1.  Martinez v. Ryan 
In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
ineffectiveness of state post-conviction counsel could provide cause to 
excuse a defaulted IATC claim and allow federal merits review.93  The 
petitioner, Luis Mariano Martinez, was convicted by an Arizona jury of two 
counts of sexual conduct with his eleven-year-old stepdaughter and 
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.94  While Martinez’s direct 
appeal was pending, his newly court-appointed post-conviction counsel 
filed claims for post-conviction review.95  Arizona law requires that claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be brought first in state collateral 
proceedings, not on direct review.96  It was only in his second notice of 
                                                          
 88.  501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 89.  Id. at 756; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (holding that states 
are not required to provide counsel for prisoners seeking post-conviction relief). 
 90.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 (concluding Coleman’s counsel could not have been 
constitutionally ineffective because “it is not the gravity of the attorney’s error that matters, but 
that it constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right to counsel”—and here there was no such right). 
 91.  Id. at 757. 
 92.  Id. at 755.  At the time of Coleman’s trial, Virginia required IATC claims to be raised in 
collateral review proceedings; however, the Court did not need to answer whether the exception 
existed because Coleman was not challenging the effectiveness of his state habeas counsel, but the 
effectiveness of his counsel during the appeal from that state habeas determination.  Id. at 755–56.  
The Court was unwilling to assure effective assistance beyond the first appeal of a criminal 
conviction.  Id. 
 93.  132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
 94.  Id. at 1313. 
 95.  Id. at 1314.  Martinez’s initial post-conviction counsel made no claim that Martinez’s 
trial counsel was ineffective.  Id.  In fact, Martinez’s first post-conviction counsel testified later 
that she could find no colorable claims regarding the conduct of Martinez’s trial counsel.  Id.  
 96.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.4 (2014); State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 153 P.3d 1040, 
1044 (Ariz. 2007) (holding “a defendant may bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims only in 
a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding—not before trial, at trial, or on direct review”).  
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post-conviction relief, and with the assistance of new counsel, that Martinez 
raised a claim of the ineffectiveness of counsel at trial.97 
The state court denied Martinez’s petition on procedural grounds, 
holding that Martinez should have raised the IATC claim in his first notice 
for post-conviction relief.98  Martinez then filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona.99  The district court denied relief on the IATC claim, reasoning 
that it had been procedurally defaulted and that ineffective state post-
conviction representation could not excuse the default.100  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.101 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question expressly 
reserved in Coleman—“whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may 
provide cause for a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding.”102  
The Court considered the specifics of Arizona’s procedural rules and 
determined that, because the initial-review collateral proceeding is the first 
proceeding in which a prisoner can raise a substantial IATC claim,103 “the 
collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct 
                                                          
 97.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.  Represented by new counsel, “Martinez claimed his trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution’s evidence.”  Id.  At trial, 
both the prosecution and defense introduced videotaped interviews with the victim.  Id. at 1313.  
In the videotape introduced by the defense, the victim denied any abuse.  Id.  The prosecution 
brought in an expert witness to explain the recantation and inconsistencies in the videos.  Id.  
Martinez claimed that his trial counsel should have objected to the prosecution’s explanation for 
the recantations and called his own expert witness in rebuttal.  Id. at 1314.  He also argued that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for not defending against the DNA evidence introduced by the 
prosecution.  Id.  For a discussion about the limitations of claims raised on successive petitions, 
see supra note 62. 
 98.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.  The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed and the Arizona 
Supreme Court declined review.  Id. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV 08-785-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 5220909, at *16 (D. Ariz. Dec. 
12, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).  The court ruled that 
“Arizona’s preclusion rule was an adequate and independent state-law ground to bar federal 
review” and under the doctrine of procedural default, the federal court was prohibited from 
reaching the merits of Martinez’s claims.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314–15. 
 101.  Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Martinez v. Ryan, 
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012); see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (“The Court of Appeals relied on 
general statements in Coleman that, absent a right to counsel in a collateral proceeding, an 
attorney’s errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for procedural default.”). 
 102.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.  The Court uses the term “initial-review collateral 
proceedings” to refer to “proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial.”  Id. (“Coleman had suggested, though without holding, that the 
Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because 
‘in [these] cases . . . state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to 
his conviction.’”  (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991))).  The Martinez 
Court, like the Coleman Court, refrained from deciding the case as a constitutional matter. 
 103.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”104  The Court also inquired 
into the potential consequence to a prisoner’s IATC claims if counsel’s 
ineffectiveness in collateral proceedings would not excuse a procedurally 
defaulted claim.  If an attorney erred in an initial-review collateral 
proceeding by failing to raise an IATC claim, then it is likely that no state 
court would ever hear such a claim.105  Moreover, if such errors would not 
establish cause to excuse the procedural default, then no federal court could 
review the prisoner’s claim.106 
Evaluating IATC claims “within the context of this state procedural 
framework,”107 the Court held: 
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, 
a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from 
hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in 
the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or 
counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.108 
In other words, inadequate state post-conviction representation can 
excuse default of an IATC claim and permit a federal court to decide the 
claim on the merits.  In establishing this exception to the general rule of 
Coleman, the Court clarified that to overcome the procedural default, the 
claim must nonetheless satisfy the prejudice prong of the cause-and-
prejudice-test.109 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, criticized the 
majority for taking an unprecedented, activist approach toward the 
“invention of a new constitutional right” and for failing to see the big 
picture consequences of its decision.110  Justice Scalia predicted that the 
                                                          
 104.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. 
 105.  Id. at 1316.  Martinez faced this same situation when trying to raise an IATC claim in his 
second notice of post-conviction relief—he had been prevented from raising the claim on direct 
review and then was prevented from raising it before a collateral state court.  Id. at 1314. 
 106.  Id. at 1316.  The Court used this as a basis to reconsider its previous statement that 
“[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as ‘cause.’”  Id. 
(quoting Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012)).  Moreover, it added that “[t]he right to 
the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system”; and if a 
prisoner receives ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and has no forum to bring that claim, 
then an exception must be made.  Id. at 1317.  The Court did not consider such an action to be 
beyond reach because “[t]he rules for when a prisoner may establish cause to excuse a procedural 
default are elaborated in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.”  Id. at 1318. 
 107.  Id. at 1318.  The state procedural framework requires a prisoner to raise an IATC claim 
in an initial-review collateral proceeding.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 1320. 
 109.  Id. at 1318. 
 110.  Id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s opinion because “no one 
really believes that the newly announced ‘equitable’ rule will remain limited to ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel cases”). 
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holding would be expanded to states other than those that required IATC 
claims to be brought only on collateral review.111  He also found it unlikely 
that the holding of the Court would remain limited to ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel cases.112  Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
majority vastly underestimated the consequences of its newly crafted 
exception.113 
2.  Application of Martinez in Federal District and Appellate 
Courts 
In the months immediately following Martinez, states attempted to 
avoid the application of the Court’s exception to Coleman in several ways.  
Some states attempted to avoid the Martinez exception by distinguishing 
their procedural framework and reasoning that it did not require a prisoner 
to raise an IATC claim in a collateral review proceeding.114  This narrow 
reading of Martinez was shut down a year later when the Court decided 
Trevino v. Thaler.115  Other states avoided Martinez by requiring the 
prisoner to have a procedurally defaulted IATC claim for the benefit of the 
Martinez exception to apply.116 
First, some federal courts following Martinez declined to extend the 
exception to a procedurally defaulted IATC claim if the prisoner could have 
raised that claim on direct appeal.117  In Ibarra v. Thaler,118 for example, 
                                                          
 111.  Id. at 1322 n.1.  Justice Scalia predicted precisely the issue to be addressed in Trevino:  
Is there any relevant difference between cases in which the State says that certain 
claims can only be brought on collateral review and cases in which those claims by 
their nature can only be brought on collateral review, since they do not manifest 
themselves until the appellate process is complete? 
Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1321.  
 113.  Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for “grossly underestimat[ing]” the frequency in 
which these claims would be raised by state prisoners.  Id. at 1327. 
 114.  See, e.g., Parkhurst v. Wilson, 525 F. App’x 736, 738 (10th Cir. 2013) (declining to apply 
the Martinez exception to the Wyoming procedural framework because although “[f]rom a 
practical perspective, it appears [the Petitioner] was unable [to] raise his claim on direct appeal,” 
he was not explicitly precluded from doing so).   
 115.  See infra Part I.D.3. 
 116.  See, e.g., Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to extend the 
Martinez exception to a procedurally defaulted Brady claim); Williams v. Mitchell, No. 1:09 CV 
2246, 2012 WL 4505181, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2012) (declining to extend Martinez to 
“allow claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish ‘cause’ for a 
‘default’ of the factual development of an Atkins claim in state court”). 
 117.  See, e.g., Parkhurst, 525 F. App’x at 738 (declining to extend the Martinez exception 
because Wyoming permitted IATC claims to be raised on direct appeal); Hodges v. Colson, 711 
F.3d 589, 612 (6th Cir.) (“Tennessee’s system does not implicate the same concerns as those that 
triggered the rule in Martinez because in Tennessee a collateral proceeding is not ‘the first 
occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.’”), amended 
and superseded, 727 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2013); Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 729 (8th Cir. 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that 
Martinez did not apply to habeas petitioners in Texas because Texas did not 
have a formal rule assigning IATC claims to post-conviction review 
proceedings.119  In dissent, Judge Graves suggested that the relevant 
consideration in applying the Martinez exception is not what the state 
procedural rules say, or do not say, but rather the place of the habeas court 
in the procedural framework.120  This approach is the basis of Trevino v. 
Thaler121 (overruling the Fifth Circuit’s position in Ibarra) and federal 
habeas courts in subsequent decisions.122 
Second, other federal courts have read Martinez to apply only to 
claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Courts have held that Martinez 
does not extend to ineffective assistance claims emerging from post-
conviction appeals123 or to other procedurally defaulted claims.124  In 
Hunton v. Sinclair,125 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that Martinez does not extend to excuse a prisoner’s 
                                                          
2012) (declining to extend the Martinez exception because Arkansas permitted IATC claims to be 
raised on direct appeal), vacated sub nom. Dansby v. Hobbs, 133 S. Ct. 2767 (2013) (mem).  
Contra Echavarria v. Baker, No. 3:98-CV-00202-MMD, 2013 WL 1181951, at *16 (D. Nev. Mar. 
20, 2013) (determining that Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted IATC claims fell under the 
Martinez exception despite Nevada procedure allowing IATC claims to be raised on direct appeal 
because that particular petitioner’s claims could not have been raised at that time).  
 118.  687 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).   
 119.  Id. at 227 (“In short, Texas procedures do not mandate that ineffectiveness claims be 
heard in the first instance in habeas proceedings, and they do not by law deprive Texas defendants 
of counsel-and court-driven guidance in pursuing ineffectiveness claims.”).   
 120.  Id. at 227–28 (Graves, J., dissenting).  Here, the Texas habeas court would be the first 
court to review the merits of Ibarra’s IATC claim.  Id. at 229.  Therefore, according to Judge 
Graves, the “equitable ruling” of Martinez was no less controlling simply because the petitioner 
could (theoretically, if not practically) have raised the claim on direct appeal.  Id. 
 121.  Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (holding that the Martinez exception 
applies to states where the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, 
makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”). 
 122.  See, e.g., Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the 
Arkansas procedure for raising an IATC claim on direct appeal was not sufficient in light of 
Trevino); Rodriguez v. Adams, No. 12-15485, 2013 WL 6052696, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2013) 
(remanding in light of Trevino because “California’s ‘state procedural framework, by reason of its 
design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a 
meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal’” 
(quoting Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921)). 
 123.  McCall v. Wengler, No. 1:12-CV-00439-EJL, 2013 WL 6858313, at *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 
30, 2013) (declining to extend Martinez because Martinez does not apply to ineffectiveness of 
post-conviction appellate counsel); Wilkinson v. Timme, No. 11-CV-00454-REB, 2012 WL 
1884518, at *2 (D. Colo. May 23, 2012) (same). 
 124.  See, e.g., Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to extend the 
Martinez exception to a procedurally defaulted Brady claim).  
 125.  732 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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procedurally defaulted Brady claim.126  Although the Court limited the 
Martinez exception to “claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,”127 
some lower federal courts have not applied the exception with such 
restraint.  One court has held that Martinez applies to establish cause to 
excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.128  Another has indicated that it might be receptive to expanding 
Martinez to other types of claims (rejecting the approach taken by the Ninth 
Circuit in Hunton).129 
3.  Trevino v. Thaler 
Petitioner Carlos Trevino was convicted in Texas for the murder of 
Linda Salinas and was sentenced to death.130  On direct appeal, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Trevino’s conviction and sentence.131  
While his direct appeal was pending, Trevino filed an application for state 
habeas corpus relief;132 of the forty-six claims he asserted for habeas relief, 
sixteen were IATC claims.133  The trial court denied relief, and the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.134 
Trevino then raised a new IATC claim in his second state habeas 
petition.135  Pursuant to the Texas writ-abuse statute, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals dismissed Trevino’s subsequent application because he 
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 1126–27. 
 127.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
 128.  Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 2013) (extending the Martinez exception 
to establish cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel). 
 129.  In Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 781 (5th Cir. 2014), the court dismissed the prisoner’s 
procedurally defaulted Brady claim.  Although the court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Hunton, the Fifth Circuit denied habeas relief because the prisoner had “insufficiently 
briefed his contention that Martinez should apply to his Brady claims.”  Id. at 782.  This decision 
perhaps leaves room for a future prisoner to sufficiently plead Martinez to establish cause for a 
procedurally defaulted Brady claim in the Fifth Circuit. 
 130.  Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013).  
 131.  Trevino v. Thaler, 678 F. Supp. 2d 445, 453–54 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 
1911 (2013).  Of the nineteen claims Trevino brought on appeal, not one asserted that Trevino’s 
trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.  Id. at 453 n.27.  
 132.  Id. at 454. 
 133.  Id. at 454 n.28. 
 134.  Id. at 454. 
 135.  Id. at 455.  After his first application for relief was denied, Trevino sought habeas relief 
in federal court.  Id. at 454–55.  The district court, however, stayed proceedings to allow Trevino 
to bring several new and unexhausted claims in state court.  Id. at 455.  In his second state habeas 
corpus application, Trevino asserted, for the first time, that “his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to adequately investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence 
during the punishment phase of [his] capital trial.”  Id. 
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had not raised that IATC claim in his initial state habeas proceeding.136  The 
district court declined to consider the merits of the procedurally defaulted 
IATC claim when raised in a federal habeas petition,137 and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.138 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Martinez exception applies in Texas, where state law permits a criminal 
defendant to raise an IATC claim in both a direct appeal and an initial 
collateral review proceeding.139  The Supreme Court held that the 
procedural default of an IATC claim will not bar a federal habeas court 
from hearing that claim when the state procedural framework renders it 
“highly unlikely” that a defendant will have a “meaningful opportunity” to 
raise such a claim on direct appeal.140  In so holding, the Court decided that 
it was the actual operation of a state’s procedural framework, and not 
strictly the wording of the procedural rules, that was relevant to whether a 
federal habeas court may excuse a procedurally defaulted IATC claim.141 
Although the Court had said previously that the Martinez exception 
applies in states that, as a matter of law, require an IATC claim to be raised 
in an initial-review collateral proceeding, the Trevino Court held that the 
absence of such an express requirement in Texas procedural rules should 
not prohibit the application of the Martinez exception.142  First, the Court 
recognized that the practical effect of the state’s appellate procedure made it 
“‘virtually impossible for appellate counsel to adequately present an 
ineffective assistance [of trial counsel] claim’ on direct review.”143  The 
                                                          
 136.  Id. at 455.  The court added: “Petitioner’s failure to comply with the Texas writ-abuse 
statute constitutes an independent and adequate ground for dismissal of a claim for federal habeas 
relief.”  Id. at 477.  The dismissal was based on abuse of the writ grounds under TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5 (West 2011).  Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415, 426, 429–30 (5th 
Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
 137.  Trevino, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 472.  The district court determined that there would be no 
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting from its denial to hear the claim and that that the 
allegedly deficient performance of Trevino’s first state habeas corpus counsel was not sufficient 
“cause” to excuse the procedural default under the cause-and-prejudice standard.  Id. at 468, 471.  
 138.  Trevino, 449 F. App’x at 416. 
 139.  Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013). 
 140.  Id. at 1921.  For a discussion on why it is almost always the case that a prisoner will not 
have a meaningful opportunity to raise an IATC claim on direct appeal, see supra text 
accompanying notes 30, 37. 
 141.  Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915.  
 142.  Id. at 1915, 1918 (“Unlike Arizona, Texas does not expressly require the defendant to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an initial collateral review proceeding.  
Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim on 
direct appeal.” (emphasis removed)). 
 143.  Id. at 1918 (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810–11 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the availability of 
both venues in the past and, in light of the often inadequate evidentiary record and time constraints 
for raising an IATC on direct appeal, the highest criminal court in Texas concluded that a habeas 
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Court went on to highlight that, “were Martinez not to apply, the Texas 
procedural system would create significant unfairness.”144  Thus, the Court 
concluded that a state that denies prisoners the ability to raise an IATC 
claim on direct appeal, and a state that grants permission but denies a 
meaningful opportunity to do so, is a “distinction without a difference.”145  
The Court held that Martinez does apply and, thus, may constitute cause to 
excuse a procedurally defaulted IATC claim for defendants in states of both 
categories.146 
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, criticized the 
majority for unraveling the narrow exception in Martinez.147  Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that the Martinez application in states where the procedural 
framework makes it highly unlikely that a defendant will have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise an IATC claim on direct appeal invited “state-by-state 
litigation” to sort out the new limits of the rule.148  According to the dissent, 
states can never be sure whether their procedures give a prisoner a 
“sufficiently meaningful opportunity,” thereby foreclosing federal habeas 
review—this degree of uncertainty frustrates states interests in finality and 
comity.149 
                                                          
writ brought in state collateral proceedings is ordinarily “essential to gathering the facts necessary 
to adequately evaluate such claims.”  Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997).   
 144.  Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919.  Post-conviction attorney error in an initial-review collateral 
proceeding will constitute cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted IATC claim—to hold 
otherwise would be to “deprive the defendant of any opportunity at all for review of an 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.”  Id. at 1921.   
 145.  Id. at 1921. 
 146.  Id.  The Court, in holding that the Martinez exception does apply, held: 
[W]here, as here, state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, 
makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful 
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, 
our holding in Martinez applies . . . .  
Id.  The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings to allow 
Trevino to establish that he was prejudiced by his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness and 
that his initial state habeas attorney was in fact ineffective.  Id.   
 147.  Id. at 1921, 1923 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  While joining the majority in Martinez, 
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the expansion of, what he believed should be, the narrow 
exception to Coleman.  Id. at 1923. 
 148.  Id.  By taking the “starch out of” Martinez’s once narrow application, Chief Justice 
Roberts was concerned with the malleability of the rule, questioning how the state procedural 
frameworks are to be assessed and how much of a chance, and what kind of chance, a prisoner 
must be given in the direct-appeal process.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 1923–24 (“[E]ven in cases where federal courts ultimately decide that the habeas 
petitioner cannot establish cause under the new standard, the years of procedural wrangling it 
takes to reach that decision will themselves undermine the finality of sentences necessary to 
effective criminal justice . . . .  [T]hat approach is inconsistent with Coleman, Martinez itself, and 
the principles of equitable discretion and comity at the heart of both . . . .”).  
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Justice Scalia, joined again by Justice Thomas, dissented for precisely 
the same reasons elaborated in the dissent in Martinez v. Ryan.150 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Part argues that, in light of the purposes animated in Martinez and 
Trevino, the rationale for the equitable exception to Coleman applies with 
equal, if not greater, strength to a case in which an inmate procedurally 
defaults a Brady claim because of inadequate state post-conviction 
representation.  Part II.A discusses the implications of the distinction 
between the equitable exception the Martinez Court created and the 
constitutional claim that it could have created.  Part II.B compares the 
similarities between IATC and Brady claims.  Although a few federal 
courts have declined to extend Martinez to other types of claims,151 Part 
II.C argues that the rationale the Court employed in creating the Martinez 
exception can, and should, be applied to Brady claims as well. 
A. The Court’s Holding in Martinez Created an Equitable 
Exception, Not a New Constitutional Right to Post-Conviction 
Representation 
Martinez and Trevino did not create a constitutional right to adequate 
state post-conviction representation.  In holding that inadequate assistance 
of post-conviction counsel may excuse the procedural default of an IATC 
claim, the Court exercised its equitable power to modify the habeas 
remedy.152  It created an exception to the generally applicable rule from 
Coleman, in which it held that failures of state post-conviction 
representation could not excuse procedural default.  The Court believed the 
equitable exception necessary to “ensure that proper consideration was 
given to a substantial claim.”153  In considering the effect on a procedurally 
defaulted IATC claim resulting from post-conviction counsel’s 
                                                          
 150.  Id. at 1924 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 151.  See supra Part I.D.2.  
 152.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).  The rules to establish cause to excuse a 
procedural default “reflect an equitable judgment that only where a prisoner is impeded or 
obstructed in complying with the State’s established procedures will a federal habeas court excuse 
the prisoner from the usual sanction of default.”  Id. at 1318; see also Giovanna Shay, The New 
State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 485 (2013) (“The Court was careful to point out that 
its opinion did not recognize a free-standing constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in 
state postconviction proceedings.  Rather, it established an equitable doctrine for overcoming 
procedural default under certain circumstances.”).  
 153.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.   
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ineffectiveness, the Court stressed the importance of having at least one 
court review a prisoner’s constitutional claims.154 
The Court’s distinction between an equitable and a constitutional 
holding has significant implications for subsequent application of the 
exception.  In creating this equitable exception, the Court declared that 
“[t]he rules for when a prisoner may establish cause to excuse a procedural 
default are elaborated in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.”155  By tying 
this exception to the underlying IATC claim, the Court expressed an 
interest in protecting the right to effective assistance of trial counsel against 
ineffective assistance at later post-conviction stages.156  If the Court had 
created a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, ineffectiveness of 
that counsel could require habeas relief.157 
Instead, states may choose between appointing counsel or not asserting 
a procedural default and defending the trial counsel’s representation on 
federal habeas review.158  On one hand, Martinez gives states an incentive 
to provide more effective counsel in post-conviction proceedings to avoid 
spending time and money defending the trial counsel’s adequacy years after 
the fact.159  On the other hand, Martinez may encourage states to provide 
better opportunities for prisoners to raise federal post-conviction claims in 
state court.160  State courts may simply afford an opportunity to litigate the 
merits of the defaulted IATC claim in its own courts.161 
                                                          
 154.  Id. at 1316; see also Ty Alper, Toward A Right to Litigate Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 851 (2013) (arguing that Martinez is “less about the right 
to counsel in postconviction proceedings and more about the right to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel”); Mary Dewey, Martinez v. Ryan: A Shift Toward Broadening Access to 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 269, 282 (2012) (“Although never explicitly stated, 
the idea that prisoners should have at least one full and fair opportunity to litigate claims is a 
resounding theme throughout the majority opinion.”). 
 155.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 156.  Id. at 1317. 
 157.  Id. at 1319 (“A constitutional ruling would provide defendants a freestanding 
constitutional claim to raise [and] it would require the appointment of counsel in initial-review 
collateral proceedings . . . .”). 
 158.  Id. at 1319–20. 
 159.  Primus, supra note 30, at 2616; see also Alper, supra note 154, at 869 (considering 
Martinez to “require” states to appoint post-conviction counsel only “to the extent that states want 
to use procedural default to avoid merits review in federal court”). 
 160.  See Primus, supra note 30, at 2617 (recognizing that instead of appointing post-
conviction counsel, states might be encouraged to “provide defendants with a realistic chance to 
contend that their Sixth Amendment rights were violated”).   
 161.  It has also been suggested that “[t]he more likely it is that the federal habeas corpus court 
will reach and decide the merits of any federal questions, the less likely that the state courts will 
rely on procedural technicalities” and this dynamic may lead to a relaxation of the effect of a 
procedural default at the state level.  Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an 
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1353 (1961). 
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Even after Martinez and Trevino, prisoners may not assert a standalone 
claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a constitutional 
error.162  Moreover, inmates must still satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
cause-and-prejudice test.163  Finally, states can respond to a prisoner’s 
federal habeas petition by asserting that the claim is insubstantial.164  
Accordingly, federal habeas courts need only consider the post-conviction 
representation at the initial phase when it affects the presentation of a 
substantial IATC claim. 
This equitable/constitutional distinction allows the Court to recognize 
attorney error as cause for other procedurally defaulted habeas claims 
without having to go through the constitutional analysis of whether counsel 
is required for that purpose.  The equitable Martinez exception should be 
applicable to other significant due process claims exhibiting many of the 
same procedural limitations, challenges, and constitutional protections.165 
B.  The Martinez Exception May Be Extended Due to the Nature of 
Brady Claims 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s 
suppression of material evidence favorable to the defendant violated his due 
process rights.166  An underlying theme in Brady, and its progeny,167 
                                                          
 162.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319; see also Johnson v. Superintendent, No. 3:12-CV-443, 2013 
WL 1176227, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2013) (holding that Martinez does not allow a petitioner to 
assert ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a free-standing claim). 
 163.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319; see also, e.g., Khan v. Gordon, No. 11–7465, 2013 WL 
4957479, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2013) (rejecting petitioner’s procedurally defaulted IATC 
claim without a hearing and finding no prejudice); United States v. Gorham-Bey, Nos. CR 7-442, 
CV 12-366, 2012 WL 3155652, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (same). 
 164.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319.  When a prisoner claims that ineffectiveness of collateral 
counsel caused the procedural default of the IATC claim, “a State may answer that the [IATC] 
claim is insubstantial, i.e., it does not have any merit or that it is wholly without factual support, or 
that the attorney in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below constitutional 
standards.”  Id. 
 165.  Justice Scalia imagined the equitable exception being expanded further to encompass 
other kinds of habeas claims.  Id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning whether anyone 
“really believes that the newly announced ‘equitable’ rule will remain limited to ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel cases”); see also Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in 
Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
591, 596 (2013) (asserting that “the equitable rationale of Martinez should apply to a number of 
claims other than ineffective assistance of trial counsel”). 
 166.  373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Brady and its progeny have established three components 
essential to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed 
by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.  Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
 167.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (expanding the prosecutors “duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including the 
police”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1986) (expanding the disclosure obligations of 
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involves the interest in avoiding unfair trials for the accused and preserving 
the truth-finding function of the adversarial process.168  Because Brady 
claims are, like IATC claims, defined by information outside the record,169 
they are usually capable of being raised for the first time only on collateral 
review.170   
Three primary considerations justify extending Martinez to excuse a 
defaulted Brady claim, forfeited because of ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel: (1) the practical necessity that Brady claims be litigated 
for the first time on collateral review;171 (2) the equitable interest in justice 
and the due process interest in providing fair trials for the accused;172 and 
(3) the absence of countervailing state interests.173 
1.  Both Brady and IATC Claims Are Best Suited for Collateral 
Review 
In Martinez, the Court determined that because an initial-review 
collateral proceeding is the first opportunity a prisoner has to raise an IATC 
claim, then that proceeding is “in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s 
direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”174  The Court also 
recognized that attorney error on a direct appeal may provide cause to 
excuse a procedural default.175  In Trevino, the Court applied the Martinez 
                                                          
the prosecution to include evidence “highly probative of innocence” even in the absence of a 
defendant’s request for such evidence); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) 
(identifying that prejudice had ensued when there was a “reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (expanding the definition of exculpatory 
material to include impeaching evidence). 
 168.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair . . . .”); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (identifying the purpose of the 
Brady rule as “not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is 
uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur”). 
 169.  By definition, a Brady claim involves material not in the trial record because a defendant 
is unlikely to have knowledge of what the prosecution withheld from the trial record until 
discovery or further investigation during the collateral review process.  See Millemann, supra note 
39, at 485 (recognizing that a Brady claim is often based on evidence outside the trial record). 
 170.  See supra text accompanying notes 37–39; see also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural 
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 679, 727 n.226 (2007) (noting that Brady claims are often raised in collateral review 
proceedings); Millemann, supra note 39, at 505–06 (“Original capital post-conviction proceedings 
often provide the only available remedy for the violations of capital fair trial rights that can be 
least tolerated: intentional or at least reckless misconduct by prosecutors and the plainest breaches 
of the responsibilities of an advocate by defense counsel.”).  
 171.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 172.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 173.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 174.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012). 
 175.  Id. 
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exception because the state procedural system did not provide “defendants a 
meaningful opportunity to present [an IATC claim] on direct appeal.”176  
States that provide prisoners only the technical opportunity to present an 
IATC on direct appeal may still fall under the Martinez exception because 
defendants are unlikely to ever have a meaningful opportunity to develop a 
sufficient IATC claim based on evidence from the trial record.177 
Similar to IATC claims, usually Brady claims must be raised on 
collateral review.178  In most instances, the evidence the state failed to 
disclose is not discovered until after the conclusion of the trial.179  Because 
of such timing, Brady content cannot be viably asserted on direct review of 
the conviction and will almost always be litigated in collateral review 
proceedings.180 
In many ways, collateral review proceedings are the equivalent of a 
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the Brady claim.181  The Court’s reasoning in 
Martinez—that effective post-conviction counsel is essential to protecting 
rights not cognizable on direct appeal—should, therefore, apply to Brady 
claims as well.182  If collateral review is the only process through which a 
prisoner can invoke his due process rights to a fair trial, then there must be 
adequate procedures in place to ensure that those rights are protected.183 
                                                          
 176.  Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). 
 177.  See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 
469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding the direct appeal process often inadequate to raise an 
IATC claim because “[t]he very ineffectiveness claimed may prevent the record from containing 
the information necessary to substantiate such a claim”). 
 178.  See supra text accompanying notes 37–39. 
 179.  See Millemann, supra note 39, at 479 (noting cases in which the capital post-conviction 
attorneys discovered “nonrecord facts that established prejudicial misconduct by the states”). 
 180.  See Givelber, supra note 40, at 1404 (“These flaws are unlikely to be exposed even by a 
competent defense lawyer at trial . . . because they relate to information never revealed to or 
discovered by the defendant . . . .”).  For example, when Trevino sought federal habeas relief, he 
raised a Brady claim in addition to an IATC claim.  Trevino v. Thaler 678 F. Supp. 2d 445, 457–
58 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).  There were several statements made by 
another witness in the case that were allegedly withheld by the prosecution.  Id.  Although the 
claims were dismissed on materiality grounds, the claim could not have arisen on direct review 
because it was not until Trevino’s federal habeas counsel conducted additional investigation that 
the statements were discovered.  Id. at 458.   
 181.  See Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2501–02 (2013) (“Read 
broadly, then, Martinez recognizes the importance of competent postconviction counsel as a 
means of protecting any rights that are not readily cognizable on direct appeal.”). 
 182.  See id. (anticipating that Martinez will be extended to excuse other procedurally 
defaulted claims because the Court’s “equitable concerns relating to the opportunity for one full 
and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional claims, either in state or federal court, would apply 
with equal force to claims such as Brady or juror misconduct that could not be raised on direct 
appeal”). 
 183.  See Givelber, supra note 40, at 1404.  Following Trevino, it should not be relevant that 
collateral review is explicitly the only place to raise the underlying procedurally defaulted claim.  
While there are no explicit state rules regulating when and how a prisoner is to raise a Brady 
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2.  Similar Equitable Interests Exist When Brady and IATC Claims 
Are Raised 
It is no coincidence that IATC claims and Brady claims are two of the 
claims raised most often on collateral review.184  These claims embody 
guarantees so central to a prisoner’s right to a fair trial that, if a prisoner is 
denied a meaningful opportunity to raise them, a serious violation of due 
process may persist without any remedy.185  The equitable holding in 
Martinez was intended to ensure some meaningful forum to enforce the 
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial, a “bedrock principle in our 
justice system.”186  Similar bedrock principles are at issue when a prisoner 
has procedurally defaulted a Brady claim because of a lawyer’s 
ineffectiveness.187 
No matter how competent trial counsel may be, a defendant will be 
deprived of the constitutional right to a fair trial if the prosecution 
withholds exculpatory evidence.188  While effective assistance of counsel 
promotes an “adversarial determination of guilt,”189 the adversarial process 
is no longer adversarial if the state withheld exculpatory information from 
the defense. 
                                                          
claim, for all practical purposes, collateral review is the only proceeding available.  The lack of 
explicit guidelines in state procedure should not weaken Martinez’s application to Brady claims. 
 184.  See Findley, supra note 19, at 600. 
 185.  See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference 
of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 422–23 (2010) (“The purpose of the Brady 
rule is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial in which all relevant evidence of guilt and 
innocence is presented to enable the fact-finder to reach a fair and just verdict.”); Steven Alan 
Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1403 
(1987) (“[T]he Brady doctrine’s overriding purpose is to ensure that the prosecutor’s suppression 
of favorable evidence in its possession does not deny a defendant who goes to trail a fair trial.”). 
 186.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).  
 187.  See Richard J. Oparil, Making the Defendant’s Case: How Much Assistance Must the 
Prosecutor Provide?, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 447, 449 (1986) (explaining that when a prosecutor 
withholds exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused in violation of Brady v. Maryland, he 
violates the due process rights of the defendant); William Scherman, John Shepard & Jason 
Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement: Due Process Issues in the Post-Epact 2005 Enforcement 
Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 67 (2010) (arguing that a “bedrock principle[] of due process” requires 
the prosecution to provide a defendant with evidence that implicates him). 
 188.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution”); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (recognizing that 
the purpose of the holding in Brady was to provide the defendant a fair trial). 
 189.  See Givelber, supra note 40, at 1404 (recognizing that there must be some process to 
determine whether counsel was effective so as to ensure that “an adversarial determination of guilt 
indeed occurred”). 
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In a way, Brady claims are less readily discoverable than IATC 
claims.190  In an IATC claim, the prisoner is focusing on the performance of 
trial counsel.  In a Brady claim, however, any state actor can violate 
Brady—and the suppressed information may be less obvious.191  Therefore, 
when a prisoner does become aware that there was material evidence not 
disclosed to his defense during trial, and post-conviction counsel fails to 
raise that Brady claim, then the unfortunate fact that the prisoner’s post-
conviction counsel was ineffective and the claim ended up procedurally 
defaulted should not deny the prisoner federal habeas review.  If that post-
conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness fails to constitute cause to excuse the 
procedural default, then that prisoner finds himself in the same dilemma 
that the Martinez Court was concerned about with regard to IATC claims: 
no state court and no federal court would be able to review the merits of the 
prisoner’s claim.192 
Both Martinez and Trevino focused on whether the prisoner had a 
meaningful opportunity to raise an IATC claim, rather than on any 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel.193  When faced with this 
issue in the future, the Supreme Court should likewise be concerned with 
whether a prisoner had a meaningful opportunity to raise an issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct and suppression of exculpatory evidence before at 
least one court, state or federal.194 
                                                          
 190.  See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Due to the nature of a Brady 
violation, it’s highly unlikely wrongdoing will ever come to light in the first place.  This creates a 
serious moral hazard for those prosecutors who are more interested in winning a conviction than 
serving justice.”); Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing 
Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 303, 306–07 (2010) (“[L]ack of compliance with the Brady rule will often go 
undetected, and it is fair to assume that most Brady violations go undiscovered.”); Samuel R. 
Wiseman, Brady, Trust, and Error, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 447, 454 (2012) (recognizing that 
Brady violations are so difficult to discover because “the only one with proof of the violation is 
often the violator.  As a result, many are never revealed.”). 
 191.  See Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1692, 1697 (1996) (identifying cases that hold Brady to apply to 
nonprosecutors); Oparil, supra note 187, at 448 (identifying other cases expanding Brady to 
impose a strict duty to preserve evidence upon the prosecution and law enforcement agencies). 
 192.  See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See Alper, supra note 154, at 871–72 (noting that the comparison in Martinez of the 
collateral proceeding to a prisoner’s direct appeal with regard to the IATC claim indicated the 
intention of the Court to provide prisoners with at least one court to review a meritorious claim). 
 194.  See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1370, 1385 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the importance of judicial attention to Brady violations, stating that 
because “the absence of the withheld evidence may result in the conviction of an innocent 
defendant, it is unconscionable not to impose reasonable controls impelling prosecutors to bring 
the information to light”). 
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3.  The Interests in Federalism and Finality Are Minimal When 
Brady Claims Are Raised in Federal Habeas Review 
While federalism principles and state interests in finality have long 
been considerations in limiting federal habeas review of state 
convictions,195 these interests historically have been treated as controlling 
only after a prisoner has had a fair opportunity to litigate a claim in state 
court.196  When these interests are invoked to justify denying a prisoner an 
opportunity to litigate a federal habeas claim, such justification “presumes a 
constitutional conviction and sentence.”197  Both ineffective assistance of 
counsel—counsel falling below Strickland’s standard of reasonableness—
and the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence—in violation of Brady—
may be sources of an unconstitutional conviction or sentence.198 
Brady imposes a special duty on the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, but it reaches other state agents as well.199  The state has no duty 
to provide prisoners post-conviction counsel; however, it does have a duty 
to “investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable information located in the 
prosecutor’s files, as well as information in the possession of any member 
of the prosecution team.”200  Because fairness in a state’s criminal process 
is in the state’s interest as a whole,201 a state’s interest in finality is minimal 
when the state is the bad actor depriving the prisoner of due process.202  It 
                                                          
 195.  See supra Part I.C.  
 196.  See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“Federalism . . . has no inherent normative value: It does not . . . blindly protect the interests of 
States from any incursion by the federal courts.  Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) 
(“[C]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the 
manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied 
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”). 
 197.  See Millemann, supra note 39, at 502 (recognizing that a state’s strong interest in finality 
is nullified when a prisoner has been unconstitutionally convicted or sentenced). 
 198.  See supra text accompanying notes 36–41. 
 199.  Hochman, supra note 191, at 1692, 1697. 
 200.  Jones, supra note 185, at 423.  This duty only arises when the prosecution knows that the 
evidence exits and is aware of its exculpatory nature.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 
(1976); see also Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1213 (2000) (explaining that the “Brady Rule” protects the constitutional 
right of a criminal defendant to have disclosed to him all “exculpatory evidence that is material to 
guilt or punishment”); Reiss, supra note 185, at 1412 (“If, however, the prosecutor actually does 
not have knowledge of the exculpatory information in her possession, a duty of disclosure does 
not arise.”). 
 201.  See Hochman, supra note 191, at 1692 (“Anyone who plays a part in bringing the power 
of the state to bear on the individual in the form of punishment must share the responsibility to 
uncover the truth that comes with that power.”). 
 202.  See Dewey, supra note 154, at 282 (“The Martinez decision affirms that promoting 
finality for state convictions is an important goal but recognizes that finality interests do not 
insulate unfair state process from federal review.”). 
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seems counterintuitive for a state to argue that a federal court is barred from 
considering a procedurally defaulted Brady claim because of post-
conviction counsel error.  The purpose of the external factor requirement to 
establish cause to overcome a procedural default—requiring a state only to 
litigate and defend against errors imputed to that state203—should not allow 
a state to exclude the errors of its agents from federal habeas review. 
Allowing a state to avoid federal merits review of a prisoner’s 
substantial Brady claim because the prisoner’s post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective does not further any interest in finality or federalism.  A state 
does not have an interest in finalizing unlawful or unconstitutional 
convictions.204  In addition, the Coleman Court’s concern that a federal 
habeas court “ignores the State’s legitimate reasons for holding the 
prisoner”205 when it reviews a prisoner’s procedurally defaulted claim is 
meritless when the state itself is the bad actor.206  In balancing its 
established interests in federalism and finality with its decisions in Martinez 
and Trevino, the Court seemed to come out in favor of providing at least 
one forum to review the merits of a prisoner’s substantial-yet-procedurally-
defaulted IATC claim.207  Thus, when a court must decide whether to afford 
a prisoner the opportunity to raise a meritorious, yet procedurally defaulted, 
Brady claim, or prioritize principles of federalism and finality, the 
prisoner’s access to federal courts to raise meritorious claims should 
prevail.208 
                                                          
 203.  See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 204.  See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (assessing the “threat to the State’s 
interests in ‘finality’” to be greater when the federal courts accept petitions that “are less likely to 
lead to the discovery of unconstitutional punishments”); Gurwitch, supra note 190, at 309 
(recognizing that all too frequently, the withholding of exculpatory evidence is a significant cause 
of wrongful convictions). 
 205.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). 
 206.  See, e.g., Freedman supra note 165, at 596 (questioning whether it was “equitable for a 
state to be able to evade federal review” of certain post-conviction claims, Brady claims included, 
simply “by contriving that the petitioner never has effective counsel to pursue them”); see also 
Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant 
Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 152 (2012) (recognizing a disconnect between the 
cause and prejudice analysis and Brady claims because “the inquiry into cause is not analogous to 
the inquiry about the underlying merits of a Brady claim. The cause inquiry focuses 
on . . . whether the defendant can show ‘some objective factor external to the defense’ to excuse 
the procedural default.  Brady, on the other hand, focuses on exculpatory evidence possessed by 
the government.”).   
 207.  See supra text accompanying note 154. 
 208.  In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court was confident that “[t]he cause and prejudice standard 
should curtail the abusive petitions that in recent years have threatened to undermine the integrity 
of the habeas corpus process.”  499 U.S. 467, 496 (1991).  If Martinez were to allow post-
conviction attorney error to constitute cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted Brady claim, the 
prejudice standard still is a safeguard against an influx of “abusive petitions.”  See Monroe v. 
Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the “materiality requirement” in 
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C.  The Actual Application of Martinez to Brady Claims 
Despite the congruence of interests between IATC and Brady claims, 
the only court specifically to consider applying Martinez to Brady claims 
declined to extend the exception.  In justifying the exception the Martinez 
Court created, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[a] prisoner’s inability to 
present a claim of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.”209  The Ninth Circuit in Hunton took 
this approach when it held that Martinez did not extend to a prisoner’s 
procedurally defaulted Brady claim.210 
Judge Fletcher’s dissent asserted that the Martinez exception should 
apply to Hunton’s Brady claim because of the many similarities between 
Hunton’s Brady claim and the IATC claims that Martinez addressed.211  
More specifically, Hunton was prevented from raising his Brady claim on 
direct appeal and Brady claims, like IATC claims, “vindicate bedrock 
principles of our judicial system.”212  The Martinez Court focused on a 
prisoner’s constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of trial 
counsel; similarly, the Brady Court and its progeny placed Brady claims at 
the core of due process protection contemplated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.213  If the purpose of habeas is to protect a prisoner’s fair trial 
                                                          
Brady ensures that “Brady obligations do not become unduly burdensome, while recognizing the 
awesome power of the prosecutor in our criminal justice system.”). 
 209.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see also Alper, supra note 154, at 872 
(“This assertion places ineffectiveness claims on par with, if not more important than, other trial 
errors that would typically be raised by appellate counsel (to which all indigent defendants are 
constitutionally entitled).”). 
 210.  Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2013).  The Ninth Circuit criticized 
Hunton’s argument as illogical.  The court’s approach is troubling because it made no inquiry 
whatsoever into the similarities between the underlying defaulted claims and why the Martinez 
exception should apply to Brady claims.  If the court understood the major premise from Martinez 
to be that prisoners should have an opportunity to litigate a substantial due process claim despite 
ineffective post-conviction counsel, and because IATC claims represent an important due process 
right, then Martinez’s ineffective post-conviction counsel did not bar federal habeas review of that 
claim.  Now, Martinez may be more easily applied to Brady claims.  As Part II.B illustrates, trial 
error—and the due process concerns the error implicates—is no less a significant concern when 
the issue is one of a Brady violation as compared to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Therefore, 
given the major premise from Martinez and the Supreme Court’s recognition that Brady claims 
protect important due process rights, Hunton’s ineffective post-conviction counsel should not have 
barred federal habeas review of a substantial Brady claim.. 
 211.  Id. at 1129–30 (Fletcher J., dissenting). 
 212.  Id. at 1130. 
 213.  See Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630–31 (2012) (reversing the prisoner’s conviction 
because the police files the prisoner obtained in state post-conviction proceedings contained 
potentially exculpatory evidence, enough so as to “undermine confidence” in the conviction); 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (“The Brady rule is based on the requirement 
of due process.  Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which 
truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”); Giles v. Maryland, 
386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (recognizing the ultimate responsibility of the state is “to provide a fair 
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rights that are not capable of assertion on direct appeal, then equitable 
interests in Martinez are no less implicated when a prisoner is denied any 
forum to raise a claim that the state had withheld material, exculpatory 
evidence regarding his defense. 
Although the Ninth Circuit viewed its holding in Hunton as consistent 
with the Court’s opinions in Martinez and Trevino, the court failed to 
appreciate the rationale and equitable notions underlying the Martinez 
exception.214  The court reduced Trevino to a footnote and said that 
“[n]othing we decide here is affected by that addition.”215  It was the 
Trevino Court, however, that realized the application of the Martinez 
exception when a state denies “as a matter of procedural design and 
systematic operation,” a prisoner a “meaningful opportunity” to raise an 
IATC claim on direct appeal.216  Due to the very nature of a Brady claim, a 
prisoner will, as a matter of procedure and operation, be directed toward 
collateral review proceedings to adjudicate a Brady claim.  In these 
proceedings the prisoner may be denied counsel, but the prisoner should not 
be denied a forum to raise a meritorious Brady claim—especially when the 
denial arises out of the prisoner’s lack of, or ineffective, counsel.  Despite 
the Court’s adherence to the procedural default doctrine as a barrier in the 
path of a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief, the result should not 
be a “Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable 
impediments to the vindication of federal rights.”217 
III. CONCLUSION 
During trial, and on any direct appeal, a prisoner is guaranteed the 
assistance of counsel.  A prisoner who chooses to pursue post-conviction 
claims in state habeas proceedings often does so pro se, or at the discretion 
of the state, with provided post-conviction counsel.  In Martinez v. Ryan, 
and then in Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s lack 
of, or ineffective, counsel in a post-conviction proceeding may excuse a 
default of a prisoner’s IATC claim.  When confronted with a Brady claim, 
however, the equitable remedy the Martinez Court applied to the harsh 
effects of the procedural default doctrine should apply to mitigate those 
                                                          
trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and no state interest is served 
by the concealment of exculpatory evidence). 
 214.  Furthermore, less than two months after the Ninth Circuit decided Hunton, in Nguyen v. 
Curry, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), the court in fact extended the Martinez exception to 
establish cause to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Id. at 1297–98.  Judge Fletcher, who dissented in Hunton, wrote the opinion for the 
panel in Nguyen.  Id. at 1289.   
 215.  Hunton, 732 F.3d at 1126 n.2 (majority opinion). 
 216.  See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text.   
 217.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 779 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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same effects to a defaulted Brady claim.  Even more than an IATC claim, a 
Brady claim is raised appropriately on collateral review and thus without 
the guarantee of counsel.218  If Martinez is not applicable, then an error by a 
prisoner’s post-conviction attorney may prevent any state or federal court 
from ever considering the merits of the prisoner’s claim. 
Although commentators have expressed doubt as to the deterrent effect 
federal habeas review has on prosecutorial conduct,219 there is a sufficient 
amount of criticism surrounding the lack of consequences for Brady 
violators.220  Ideally, federal habeas review of a Brady claim would 
encourage better prosecutorial conduct; however, that is not the ultimate 
purpose of federal habeas review.221  The purpose of federal habeas review 
is to guarantee that a prisoner’s conviction is not unlawful and that due 
process rights have not been compromised.  If a prisoner’s post-conviction 
counsel’s ineffectiveness results in no state court reviewing the merits of a 
substantial Brady claim, then the denial of Martinez to the claim frustrates 
the Court’s interest in providing prisoners at least one forum to raise a 
substantial due-process claim (especially one not able to be raised on direct 
appeal, with the assistance of counsel). 
By adhering to an “equitable” exception, however, the Martinez-
Trevino duo may do nothing, or very little for the pro se habeas 
                                                          
 218.  See supra text accompanying notes 38–41; see also Findley, supra note 19, at 615 
(acknowledging that because Brady claims are almost never part of the direct appeal process, 
appellate counsel “has neither the capacity, institutional obligation, nor incentive to find and raise 
claims related to newly discovered Brady material during the direct appeal”). 
 219.  See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 810 (2009) (recognizing that habeas review is not an 
effective deterrence of constitutional errors); Jones, supra note 185, at 420 (recognizing that 
“when Brady violations are discovered—even when the violations are intentional and blatant—
trial judges focus on curing any harm suffered by the defendant but fail to take punitive measures 
against the offending prosecutor to deter future Brady violations”).  But cf. Tracey L. Meares, 
Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial 
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 900 (1995) (“Whether or not reversal of a conviction 
should be “counted” as a sanction for misconduct, reversal affects the prosecutor’s behavior.”). 
 220.  See, e.g., Brian T. Kohn, Brady Behind Bars: The Prosecutor’s Disclosure Obligations 
Regarding DNA in the Post-Conviction Arena, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 35, 58 
(2003) (“[S]anctions such as suspension and disbarment, that should deter prosecutors from 
committing such violations are rarely enforced and largely ineffective.”); Gurwitch, supra note 
190, at 318 (commenting that “[d]iscipline is too rare and too mild to have any deterrent effect” on 
Brady violations); Kurcias, supra note 200, at 1215 (“While the Supreme Court requires 
prosecutors to disclose certain evidence to the defense, consequences for withholding such 
evidence do not exist in the criminal justice system.”). 
 221.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (asserting that punishment or the misdeeds of 
the prosecutor was not the policy behind its opinion); see also Gurwitch, supra note 190, at 307 
(identifying the “paramount interest” of the Brady Court was “the protection of an accused 
individual’s right to a fair trial”). 
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petitioner.222  To bring a substantial claim, a prisoner likely will need an 
attorney to assist in investigation and litigation.223  Absent a constitutional 
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the likelihood that a 
prisoner will be able to raise a substantial IATC or Brady claim is greatly 
reduced.224  The application of the equitable exception to Brady may force 
states into additional litigation; however, if the assorted litigated claims are 
meritorious, the additional burden on the states is no match for the interest 
in constitutional and just criminal proceedings, convictions, and sentences. 
 
                                                          
 222.  See Alper, supra note 154, at 869 (“Most pro se prisoners are unlikely to be able to 
investigate and then present, in federal court, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that 
survives the initial merits review Martinez prescribes; . . . ineffectiveness claims almost always 
require the kind of extra-record investigation and development that can only be accomplished by 
collateral counsel and resources for investigation.”); Reitz, supra note 161, at 1351 (“Even if the 
door to federal habeas corpus is open, there is no guarantee that the state prisoner, likely 
compelled to proceed without the assistance of counsel, can even get his petition heard by the 
federal judge.”). 
 223.  See supra note 222.  
 224.  See Alper, note 154, at 868–70; see also Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance 
After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2451 (2013) (noting that Martinez is “unlikely to increase the 
provision of counsel and hearings in those state postconviction cases that are filed”). 
